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Electoral Reforms in Poland after 1991 and Their Political 
Consequences*
Michal Kubát
Abstract: This article analyses the phenomenon of electoral engineering in con-
temporary Poland. The aim is to study the causes and especially the consequences of 
electoral reforms in relation to political parties and the party system as a whole. This 
analysis is supported by a number of empirical indicators, e.g. over-representation and 
under-representation of political parties, aggregation, fragmentation and polarization 
of the party system, etc. The Polish case study excellently demonstrated the theories of 
the direct inﬂuence of the electoral system on the party system, both in a positive and
negative sense. Politicians can use electoral reform to help stabilize the party system 
and the political régime as a whole (Polish electoral reform of 1993), or they can use 
the same tool to help themselves (to ease re-entry into parliament), but at the expense 
of stabilization of the party system (Polish electoral reform of 2001).
Key words: election, electoral system, electoral engineering, parties and party 
system, Poland
Introduction
Poland provides us with a unique example of electoral engineering in East Central 
Europe. Wherein lies its distinctive status in this respect? Poland is a country where 
reforms of the electoral system are frequent. Five parliamentary election have taken 
place in the last 15 years, and three electoral systems were used in the process (the 
semi-free election of 1989 are not included). Only twice did two consecutive election 
take place according to the same electoral system (election in 1993 and 1997, and in 
2001 and 2005). Moreover, since 1989 there have been lively and ongoing discussions 
about the electoral system and its possible changes on both key levels of discourse 
– academic as well as political (see Chruściak 1999, Dudek 2004). Polish electoral 
engineering efforts are not determined by any “objective” criteria: they are a direct 
consequence of political decisions, which is a fact of major importance for further 
analysis. The electoral system is widely regarded as a technical instrument, which can 
be changed or ﬁne-tuned according to current needs and with the aim of reaching the
desired political consequence. Politicians change the system because they want to, not 
because they have to. In fact, Poland uses electoral engineering as a tool of everyday 
politics. We will try to analyse this interesting and extraordinary situation and try to 
determine what are its causes and likely consequences. 
* This article is a revised and updated version of the text (Kubát 2004: 88-121). I am also pleased to 
acknowledge support of grant number MSM0021620841 (Development of Czech Society in the EU: 
Challenges and Risks) in the preparation of this text and to Mr Kryštof Kozák for his help.
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Electoral Systems in Poland after 199113
For election to the Lower Chamber of the Polish Parliament (Sejm), the electoral 
system has been based on proportional representation since 1991. As we can see, 
Polish politicians have not changed the basic form of the electoral system, which 
is still based on proportional representation to this day, but they have modiﬁed its
technology and characteristics. By the technology of an electoral system we mean its 
construction (what are its components), and by characteristics we mean the likely ef-
fects and consequences of such a system. Both these variables are unavoidably related. 
When describing the Polish model of proportional representation, we will put special 
emphasis on constituencies, mathematical methods of seat allocation, and the electoral 
threshold, because these are the variables which have the most inﬂuence on outcomes
in the proportional representation electoral system. 
The signiﬁcance of constituencies is based on two characteristics: their shape and
size. The most important variable is size, which means the number of seats that can 
be won in such a constituency. Constituencies in Poland have multiple seats available, 
which is understandable given the proportional nature of the Polish electoral system. 
The size of these constituencies has changed frequently since 1991. Under the elec-
toral system adopted in 1991 the country was divided into 37 regional constituencies, 
in which 397 of the total 460 members of parliament were elected (the remaining 
69 members of parliament were elected in one large constituency, which covered the 
whole country). The size of the regional constituency ranged from 7 to 17 available 
seats (10.3 being the average size). The electoral system of 1993 kept the distinction 
between several regional and one nationwide constituency, even up to the ratio of seats 
allocated to each segment. The number and size of the regional constituencies changed, 
however. There were now 52 constituencies, with the number of seats ranging from 
3 to 17 (almost half of the districts had 3 to 5 seats, with the average being 7.4). The 
year 2001 brought additional changes. The nationwide constituency was abolished, and 
all members of parliament (460) were elected in regional constituencies. There were 
41 of them, with their size ranging between 7 to 19 seats (the average being 11.2). 
The 1991 electoral system contained two mathematical methods for seat/vote redis-
tribution. The largest remainder method, using the Hare-Niemeyer quota, was used at 
the regional constituency level. At the nationwide constituency level the Sainte-Laguë 
method was used, albeit in a modiﬁed version: the ﬁrst divisor was not one (1) as in
the original method, but one and four tenths (1.4) instead. From 1993 to 1997 the 
d´Hondt method was used both at the regional and nationwide constituency levels. In 
2001 Poland went back to the Sainte-Laguë method, with the same modiﬁed version
as adopted in 1991. As the nationwide constituency has been abolished, this method is 
the only valid one in all, i.e. regional constituencies. 
13 For more details about the topic see (Antoszewski, 2002b: 60-71; Chruściak, 1999: 57-145, 185-201; 
Jackiewicz, 2004: 48-65; Jednaka, 2002: 78-94; Krzekotowska 2005; Lisicka 2005, 32-51; Piasecki, 
2003: 29-106).
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In Poland the electoral threshold has not always been taken for granted. The ﬁrst
electoral system (1991) contained only a limited version of the threshold, applicable 
in the nationwide constituency, where only 15 per cent  of all seats were allocated. In 
order to qualify for seats and their redistribution on the nationwide level, a political 
party needed to reach the 5 per cent threshold in all the regional constituencies or to 
get seats in at least ﬁve regional constituencies. On the level of regional constituencies
(85 per cent of seats), there was no electoral threshold. The electoral system from 
1993 established the 5 per cent threshold for political parties, an 18 per cent threshold 
for coalitions in the regional constituencies, and a 7 per cent threshold in the one 
nationwide constituency. In 2001 a uniﬁed threshold of 5 per cent  for political parties
and 8 per cent  for coalitions was introduced.14 
Electoral reforms in Poland – what was changed, why, and with what 
results?
There were many electoral reforms in Poland on all levels (all types of election 
underwent some changes except  general presidential election), so it is expedient to 
start with a certain systematization of the process. As a working concept, we could 
divide Polish electoral reform with respect to two categories:
1. its characteristics;
2. its goals.
In the ﬁrst case, analytical distinction can be made between “political” and “techni-
cal” electoral reforms. “Political” electoral reforms are reforms of the electoral system, 
which arise from a given political situation and aim to achieve another, i.e. their goal 
is to inﬂuence political parties and the party system, and through them eventually
even politics itself. Both reforms of the electoral system for the parliamentary election 
in 1993 and 2001 and the electoral reform of the municipal election in 200215 can 
be classiﬁed as “political” electoral reforms. On the other hand, “technical” electoral
reforms are those which arise because of necessary adjustments to changed conditions 
at the level of the political system. The electoral system is adapted to the constitutional 
framework, as there should not be any discrepancy between the two. A typical example 
of a “technical” electoral reform is the reform of the electoral system for local election 
in 1998, which followed a wide-ranging reform of the whole administrative structure 
of the country, effective since 1 January 199916. 
14 It is important to note that in all the aforementioned cases, the thresholds have not been applicable for 
political groups representing national minorities. As a result, there are now (after the election of 2005) 
two representatives of the German minority in the Sejm. 
15 The direct election of mayors being one of the principal changes (for more information, see Kubát, 2003: 
78-80; Piasecki, 2003: 163-191). 
16 This reform diminished the number and enlarged the size of the województwo (voivodship and province) 
and introduced self-governing districts as links between the larger regional and smaller county admi-
nistrations. The provinces acquired autonomy, and regional parliaments started to be elected in direct 
general election. More on this topic in Dudek (2004: 458-460); Kubát (1999).
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The second distinction that we can make is between “legitimate” and “special-
-interest” electoral reforms. A “legitimate” electoral reform attempts to ameliorate 
an evidently malfunctioning party system, whereas “purposeful” electoral reform is 
a result of interplay between political parties which are trying to use the systemic 
change to enhance their chances in the upcoming election. This distinction may seem 
unclear at the moment, but it will become understandable once we analyse both major 
Polish electoral reforms in 1993 and 2001. These two reforms are effective examples 
of both types, the one of 1993 being “legitimate”; the 2001 “purposeful”. They are also 
relevant for the topic of this study, as here we can clearly see the relationship and its 
consequences, between the electoral and the party systems. 
The electoral Reform of 1993, Its Origins and Consequences 
The electoral system adopted in 1991, which was characterized by its maximum 
proportion, was deliberately adopted, and these proportional effects were considered 
to be a desirable consequence of the system. From 1989 to 1991, apart from gradual 
fragmentation in Parliament, the political scene further disintegrated also outside the 
Sejm (in those years the number of registered political parties reached 100)17. Most of 
them did not have any representation in Parliament but harboured such ambitions. In 
this situation it was considered prudent to allow for the most representative reﬂection
of the political situation in the country in Parliament18. Many MPs were thinking along 
these lines as they tried to guarantee further parliamentary existence of their freshly 
formed groupings (this was a time of tumultuous formation of the party system due 
to disintegration of the Solidarity movement). As a result, an electoral system was 
adopted which satisﬁed these ambitions (Antoszewski, 1999: 91).
The high extent of proportionality of the 1991 electoral system was ensured by the 
following aspects of the system: 
1. larger constituencies;
2. chosen method of seat allocation of seats within regional constituencies;
3. chosen method of seat allocation of seats in the nationwide constituency;
4. almost absolute absence of electoral thresholds;
5. limited barriers for registration of lists in electoral districts.
This electoral system did not cause the extreme fragmentation of the party sys-
tem per se, but it enabled the fragmented political system to be relatively accurately 
represented in parliament; this was due to the fact that the system did not in any way 
skew the election results in favour of large parties (it was more or less neutral, which 
enabled the smaller parties to acquire seats). The Sejm was in the end composed of 
17 One of the causes was a new law regulating political parties, which did not contain any major barriers 
for registration of new parties (see Grylak, Żmigrodzki, 2005: 280-281).
18 It should be noted that the Sejm which resulted from semi-free election of 1989 reﬂected “old“ political
realities connected with the transformation towards democracy. In 1991 it did not any way possess the 
necessary legitimacy and was by no means politically representative of the country as a whole. 
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29 political groupings (24 electoral committees19)! Rae’s (1971: 53-58) fragmentation 
index was 0.94 on the parliamentary level, and Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979: 3-27) 
index of the effective number of parties was approximately 10 (Kubát 2000:104)!20 At 
the same time we are witnessing a signiﬁcant deconcentration of the party system. The
strongest party (Democratic Union) held only 13.48 per cent of seats in the Sejm, and 
the two strongest parties combined (Democratic Union and Alliance of the Democratic 
Left) held only 26.52 per cent  of seats. Small political parties indeed beneﬁted from
the electoral system, which can be demonstrated by their over-representation in the 
Sejm (their percentage share of seats was greater than their percentage share of votes; 
the index value was larger than 1). All political parties which received more than 
3 per cent of the votes were over-represented, including several weaker parties which 
did not register their candidates in all electoral districts. The values of the deforma-
tion index (percentage of seats divided by percentage of votes) are not extreme, and 
over-representation does not exceed 1.5 (except for two speciﬁc regional parties). As 
a whole, the electoral system more or less reﬂected the preferences of the voters.
Table 1: Deformation index index in 1991
Political arty  % of Votes Seats/% of Seats Deformation index
Democratic Union 12.32 62/13.48 1.094
Alliance of the Democratic Left 11.99 60/13.04 1.088
Polish Peasant’s Party (SP)* 9.22 50/10.87 1.179
Catholic Election Action** 8.98 50/10.87 1.211
Confederation for an 
Independent Poland*** 8.88 51/11.09 1.249
Civic Centre Alliance 8.71 44/9.57 1.099
Liberal Democratic Congress 7.49 37/8.04 1.073
Polish Peasant’s Party(PL) 5.47 28/6.09 1.113
Solidarity Trade Union 5.05 27/5.87 1.162
Polish Friends of Beer Party 3.27 16/3.48 1.172
German Minority 1.17 7/1.52 1.299
Christian Democracy 2.25 5/1.09 0.484
19 Strictly speaking, political parties or coalitions do not participate in election. These organizations need to 
form election committees (komitety wyborcze), which take part in election. In the last communal election 
in 2002 there was a tactical trend of calling election committees by names other than those of the parties 
who formed them (Kubát, 2003: 82-83).
20 From 1945 to 1979 the average value of the Rae’s fragmentation index on the parliamentary level in 
16 Western European countries was 0.7, and from 1980 to 1994 it was 0.7 as well. The average value 
of the effective number of parties in the same 16 countries in the same time periods was 3.4 and 3.8 
respectively (Herbut, 1997: 174 and 177). In the Central and Eastern European region the highest Rae’s 
fragmentation index was at that time in Slovenia (0.85 in 1992), the lowest in Bulgaria (0.59 in 1991). 
The highest value of the effective parties index was again in Slovenia (6.58 in 1992) and the lowest in 
Bulgaria (2.41 in 1991) (Kubát 1999: 105-106). 
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Labour Solidarity 2.06 4/0.87 0.408
Christian Democrat Party 1.12 4/0.87 0.777
Union of Real Policy 2.25 3/0.65 0.289
Party X 0.47 3/0.65 1.383
Movement for Silesian Autonomy 0.36 2/0.43 1.194
Democratic Party 1.42 1/0.22 0.155
Democratic-Social  Movement 0.46 1/0.22 0.478
Podhalan Union 0.22 1/0.22 1.000
Great Poland’s Social-democratic 
Union 0.20 1/0.22 1.100
Christian-Social Union**** 0.12 1/0.22 1.833
Solidarity ‘80 0.11 1/0.22 2.000
Union of  Great Poles 0.08 1/0.22 2.750
Others 6.18 - -
*  Two seats and the corresponding votes of the “Piast” Peasant Election Alliance (town of Tarnów) and 
Peasant Unity (town of Bygdoszcz) were added to the Polish Peasant’s Party ﬁgures.
** One seat and the corresponding votes of MP M. Gil from Kraków were added to Catholic Election 
Action results. 
*** Four seats and the corresponding votes of the Polish Western Union and 1 seat of an MP from the 
Alliance of Women Against Life’s Hardships were added to the Confederation for an Independent 
Poland ﬁgures.
**** An MP from the Christian-Social Union, on the electoral list of Electoral Committee of Orthodox 
Believers, was elected in the town of Białystok
Not all parties registered their candidates in all constituencies (some of them were regional). This 
explains the difference in the ordering according to the acquired votes and seats, as well as the ﬂuctuation
in the values of the deformation index.
Sources: Gebethner (1993: 15); Kubát (2000: 69); Żukowski (1992: 36-37) 
The parliament which resulted from the 1991 election did not and could not fulﬁl its
task of working throughout the full term and forming a majority, which would ensure 
the stability of government.21 The electoral reform of 1993 was undertaken with the 
aim of preventing the unstable political situation from 1991 to 1993. The fundamental 
aim was to bar the entry into Parliament of the small and ephemeral political parties 
and thereby to diminish the fragmentation of the Sejm, even at the expense of the 
decreased representativeness of the body.
The electoral reform contained the following key aspects:
1. diminishing of the size of the constituencies;
2. change of the seat allocation formulas;
3. introduction of electoral thresholds;
4. change to conditions, under which party lists can be registered. 
21 Parliament was dissolved in 1993 after the vote on May 28 of no conﬁdence in the Government of Prime
Minister H. Suchocka by a one-vote margin. From 1991 to 1993 Poland had three Prime Ministers (the 
composition of governments being changed frequently) (see Dudek 2004: 228-323).
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The electoral reform of 1993 helped the stronger political parties. The electoral 
threshold simply disqualiﬁed the political parties which were not able to attain it
(Duverger’s /1965: 224-225/ mechanical effect). Only six groupings managed to get 
into the Sejm. More importantly, smaller constituencies and adjusted seat allocation 
formulas increased the natural threshold and made the position of smaller parties more 
difﬁcult at the constituency level. Whereas in the Warsaw constituency 3.39 per cent
of the votes were needed in order to get one seat in 1991 (in 1993 the number rose 
to 4.03 per cent of the votes), in the Biała Podlaska constituency 8.34 per cent of the 
votes were needed for one seat in 1991, and in 1993 the percentage rose to 17.21 per 
cent  (Gebethner, 1995: 13). Large political parties gained a further advantage as the 
electoral reform caused their over-representation and thus helped in the subsequent 
process of majority formation in Parliament. The strongest political grouping (Alliance 
of the Democratic Left) gained 37.17 per cent of seats (after the 1997 election the 
strongest party, Solidarity Election Action, held 43.69 per cent of seats) and the two 
strongest groupings together held 65.86 per cent of seats (in 1997 the number rose to 
79.34 per cent of seats - Solidarity Election Action and the Freedom Union). 
Table 2: Deformation index in 1993
Political Party % of Votes Seats/% of Seats Deformation index
Alliance of the Democratic 
Left 20.41 171/37.17 1.821
Polish Peasant’s Party 15.40 132/28.69 1.862
Democratic Union 10.59 74/16.08 1.518
Labour Union 7.28 41/8.90 1.223
Confederation for an 
Independent Poland 5.77 22/4.78 0.828
Non-Party Reform Bloc 5.41 16/3.47 0.641
German Minority* 0.62 4/0.8 1.290
* The electoral threshold does not apply to the German Minority party. 
Source: Kubát (2000: 75), author’s calculations.
Electoral reform turned out to be most favourable for the two largest political 
parties.  Medium-sized parties have also been over-represented, but only slightly. On 
the other hand, small parties (around 5 per cent of popular votes) became under-repre-
sented (with the exception of the regional German minority). As a result it was easier 
to form a parliamentary majority, which completed its term (until the 1997 election), 
and guarantee better conditions for a stable governing coalition. 
On the whole, the concentration of the party system increased, measured by Ma-
yer’s (1980: 335-347) Aggregation Index, which calculates the position of the strongest 
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party in Parliament with respect to other parliamentary parties. In 1991 the value of 
this index was unbelievably low 0.56 (!); in 1993 it rose to “normal” levels of 5.31 
(and 7.28 in 1997).22
Electoral reform brought a stabilization of the party system. Rae’s fragmentation 
index fell to 0.74 (after the 1997 election to 0.66) and the index of the effective number 
of parties shrank to approximately 3.90 (2.95 after the 1997 election). This dramatic 
decrease of ﬁgures in these indexes undoubtedly positively inﬂuenced further political
development. The values of both indexes were still relatively high, but they did not 
differ very much from those in Western European democracies. Furthermore, they 
showed a clear downward trend. 
Electoral reform positively inﬂuenced the party system by eliminating ephemeral
political groupings and encouraging integration attempts, which led to temporary 
uniﬁcation of the political spectrum on the political right23 and freezing of integration 
on the political left.24
A further consequence of the 1993 electoral reform was a disturbing ﬂuctuation of
Rose’s proportionality index (see Rose, 1984: 73-81), which was a mere 64 in 1993 
(in 1991 it was 91 and in 1997 it rose  slightly to 81) (Sokół, 2005: 267).25 This ﬂuctu-
ation is related among other factors to the psychological effect (see Duverger, 1965: 
224-226), which had an impact on voter behaviour after electoral reform. In 1993 
a total of 4,727,972 votes (34.52 per cent) were discarded, as voters did not realize 
the full extent of the new electoral system and were casting votes for small parties, 
which, given the changes in electoral rules had no hopes of getting into Parliament. 
This occurrence was only temporary. In 1997 “only” 1,652,833 votes were discounted 
(12.43 per cent) (Kubát, 2000: 109). This development had been foreseen and tole-
rated, as it was considered to be a trade-off for more political stability and improved 
effectiveness of both Parliament and the Government.
The dramatic rise of the extra-parliamentary opposition can be described as the 
short-term negative consequence of electoral reform. Such an opposition became 
radicalized and much more confrontational. However, these effects turned out to be 
transitory. On the other hand, the electoral reform forced political parties to pursue 
consensual negotiations, which often ended in the integration of the extra-parliamen-
tary opposition. Many political groups simply stopped their activities thanks to the 
22 The ﬁgures come from a calculation made by the author. For comparison, in 16 Western European
countries from 1980 to 1994 the average value of the aggregation index was 7.47 (Herbut, 1997: 179).
23 In 1996 Solidarity Electoral Action was formed, which lasted until the election in 2001, when it dissolved 
as a result of the problematic record of its government from 1997 to 2001 and the related loss of voter 
conﬁdence.
24 The Alliance of the Democratic Left was transformed in 1999 from a coalition into a uniﬁed political
party.
25 The values of this index range from 0 – absolute disproportionality, to 100 – absolute proportionality. 
The ﬁgure of 63 is indeed extremely low in international comparison. It is sufﬁcient to note that values
for this index in Europe (Western as well as East Central) usually range somewhere between 80-95 (see 
Antoszewski, 1997: 242; Rose, Munro, Mackie, 1998: 117; Wiszniowski, 1998: 100; Kubát 1999: 102).
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new electoral system, as they realized the impossibility of access to Parliament and 
therefore the futility of their further existence. 
The overall assessment of the reform is no doubt positive. It contributed to gre-
ater concentration and stabilization of the party system. On the parliamentary level, 
a drastic reduction of the fragmentation of the party system took place. Despite initial 
wavering, the stabilization eventually spread to the extra-parliamentary level as well 
and resulted in integrative processes in the political sphere. This stabilization on both 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary levels brought a relatively effective Parliament 
in the medium run (also after the 1997 election), which was able to form majorities 
essential for functioning governments. 
The electoral reform of 2001 – its political causes and consequences
The electoral reform of 2001 differed from the one of 1993. It varied especially with 
regards to its origins. In the beginning of this article the electoral reform of 2001 was 
classiﬁed as “purposeful”, as opposed to the preceding reform of 1993. This relatively
vague concept becomes clear when we look at the root causes of the reform. To unders-
tanding it, a brief analysis of Polish politics before the 2001 election is necessary. 
In the 1997 parliamentary election two right-leaning groupings, Solidarity Election 
Action (it was in fact a coalition of parties, not a political party) and the Freedom 
Union, won overwhelmingly and formed a governing coalition (combined, they held 
66.7 per cent of all seats). It was the ﬁrst time since 1989 when the political right con-
solidated, overcame its fragmentation and had a chance to implement its programme 
without restraints. This opportunity was badly squandered. Theoretical and practical 
differences concerning the best governing programme on the political right, a lack 
of cohesion of the governing coalition, later a lack of cohesion within the Solidarity 
Election Action coalition, bad personal relations within the Government, a number 
of political as well as criminal scandals, coupled with the plain incompetence of the 
coalition politicians all resulted in the creation of serious economic problems on the 
one hand and fatal problems in the political sphere on the other hand. As a result, the 
conﬁdence of the public in the Government as well as in the political groups on the
right fell dramatically. Another consequence has been turmoil on the political right, 
which resulted in complete rearrangement on this side of the political spectrum. The 
long-term and arduous task of building a uniﬁed political right was thwarted. Both
main political groups on the right (Solidarity Election Action and the Freedom Union) 
disintegrated, and the coalition government formed by these two groups collapsed. 
A number of smaller right-wing parties emerged out of its ashes. Whereas the 1997 
parliamentary election resulted in a relatively well-arranged and consolidated bi-polar 
model of the political right26, a dispersed model of four right-wing groups was formed 
26 Solidarity Election Action coalition on one side and Freedom Union on the other. The right-wing populist 
Movement for Rebuilding Poland was present in the Sejm as well, but it did not take part in any major 
political events. 
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before the 2001 election.27 Besides, two extreme groups began to gain ground – the 
extremely populist Self-Defence of the Polish Republic and a brand new coalition of 
fundamentalist Catholics and nationalists called the League of Polish Families. This 
took everybody by surprise and was of major importance if we are to understand the 
ensuing events (Dudek, 2004: 431-507; Kubát, 2001: 126-129).  
The dire situation of the political right was duly reﬂected in polling trends. The
preferences of voters for right-wing parties declined steadily and precipitously (in 
some cases to down to the limit of the electoral threshold), whereas the uniﬁed left
experienced steady growth in terms of voter preferences, reaching even beyond the 
magical 50 per cent of votes. Both extremist groupings mentioned above experienced 
a sharp increase in preferences. Only the Polish Peasant’s Party kept its stable core of 
voters (ranging from 7 to 11 per cent), which was a rather unusual occurrence at that 
time (for more detailed analysis, see Kubát 2001: 129-130). 
The aforementioned disintegration of the political right, together with voter pre-
ferences at the time, became key impulses for the electoral reform of 2001.28 A new 
electoral law was pushed through by deputies on the right, whose new parties faced 
the existential problem of getting their members into Parliament again, which was 
a consequence of the aforementioned developments. Fear of a decisive victory of the 
Alliance of the Democratic Left in the upcoming election was the second major factor 
of importance, as voter support for the party hovered around 50 per cent according to 
polls (it subsequently acquired much less in the actual election). Right-wing MPs did 
not heed frequent warnings not to change the electoral system to suit  their particularis-
tic interests and ﬁnally passed the new electoral law on 12 April 2001, just six months
before the election date (sic!) (MPs of the Alliance of the Democratic Left voted against 
the law). The new electoral system was passed surprisingly smoothly when compared 
with the reforms in 1991 and 1993, when major political controversies, delays and 
even obstructions had occurred (Zdort 2001).
It is evident that the electoral reform of 2001 was not enacted in an attempt to 
improve the functioning of the party system and the political system as a whole (as 
was the case in 1993), but because of particularistic political interests of the smaller 
political parties. This argument will become clear when we look at the origins and 
effects of the reform. 
27 These parties emerged from the divisions within Solidarity Election Action and Freedom Union: Civic 
Platform; Law and Justice; remnants of the Freedom Union and the severely undermined Solidarity 
Election Action “Right” with a modiﬁed name (furthermore, as a coalition it contained other parties as
well). To add to this, important and not exactly clear personal changes occurred, with politicians from 
different parties joining new groupings and their party lists.  
28 Another reason, which was only technical, was the necessity to adjust the electoral districts to the new 
administrative system oF the country after the reform of 1998 (parliamentary and senatorial constituen-
cies were identical to the old voivodships), in order to forestall organizational and legal (constitutional) 
difﬁculties (Zdort 2001). This was not in any way related to the political outcomes of the electoral reform
and it played only a marginal role in the discussions of parliament, which were motivated almost purely 
by political consequences of the proposed reform. 
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The electoral reform had the following basic characteristics with respect to its 
effects:
1. increase in size of constituencies;
2. elimination of the nationwide constituency; 
3. change of the mathematical method for seat allocation; 
4. change in the means of ﬁnancing electoral campaigns.
The ﬁrst three points had the most inﬂuence on the change in consequences of the
electoral system; the last point did so only to a limited extent29. 
The electoral reform of 2001 had several effects. It mitigated the over-representa-
tion of political parties. It may be true that all parties became over-represented, with 
larger parties more so, but the differences were however minimal. Moreover, we can 
see a slightly growing over-representation among the smallest parties. Compared with 
effects of the electoral system of 1993, the over-representation of large political parties 
is signiﬁcantly lower; the same holds true for medium-sized parties (see Table 2).30 This 
trend is even more signiﬁcant if we compare the level of the deformation index in 1997
(under the electoral system of 1993) and in 2001 (see Tables 3 and 4). A shift in favour 
of medium-size and smaller parties of the new electoral system then becomes evident. 
Table 3: Deformation index in 2001
Political Party % of Votes Seats% of Seats Deformation index
Alliance of the Democratic 
Left – Labour Union 41.04 216/46.96** 1.144
Civic Platform 12.68 65/14.13 1.114
Self-Defence 10.20 53/11.52 1.129
Law and Justice 9.50 44/9.57 1.007
Polish Peasant’s Party 8.89 42/9.13 1.028
League of Polish Families 7.87 38/8.26 1.050
German Minority* 0.36 2/0.43 1.194
* The electoral threshold does not apply to the German Minority party.
** The Labour Union formed an independent parliamentary club with 16 members after the election.
Source: Kubát (2001: 135), authors’s calculations.
29 The electoral law made the ﬁnancing of campaigns stricter through various limitations. State subsidies
for political parties increased, with only those parties that gained more than 3 per cent of the votes in 
the last election and coalitions which gained more than 6 per cent, being eligible for subsidies (Piasecki 
2003:87). These limitations were advantageous for weaker and “poorer” parties (mainly for those outside 
Parliament) and more or less unfavourable for strong and “rich” parties. The new electoral law brought 
additional minor modiﬁcations, which had almost no political signiﬁcance (see Jackiewicz, 2004: 58-59;
Piasecki 2003: 88-89). 
30 Unfortunately we cannot compare the extent of deformation for the small parties with voter support just 
above the electoral threshold because in 2001 no such parties were elected to Parliament (the weakest 
party had almost 8 per cent of votes). In 1993 such parties were under-represented, and even more so 
in 1997 (the electoral system stayed the same, but the psychological effect of the electoral threshold 
inﬂuenced voting behaviour).
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Table 4: Deformation index in 1997
Political party % of votes Seat/% of Seats Deformation index
Solidarity Election Action 33.83 201/43.69 1.291
Alliance of the Democratic Left 27.13 164/35.65 1.314
Freedom Union 13.37 60/13.04 0.975
Polish Peasant’s Party 7.31 27/5.87 0.803
Movement for Rebuilding Poland 5.56 6/1.30 0.234
German Minority* 0.39 2/0.43 1.194
* For the German Minority party the electoral threshold does not apply.
Source: Kubát (2000: 90), author’s calculations
The new electoral system also increased the proportionality of representation. A rise 
in ﬁgures of the proportionality index had occurred in 1997 without modiﬁcations of the
electoral system as a result of the psychological effect of the electoral threshold. Unders-
tandably, the electoral reform of 2001 further highlighted this trend and the proportionality 
index climbed to 90 (Sokół, 2005: 267), almost back to the 1991 level (see above). 
Another consequence of the electoral reform was a halt in the growth of concentra-
tion of the party system in Poland. The electoral reform could not stop this trend, but it 
slowed it down signiﬁcantly. The aggregation index fell to 6.71 (author’s calculation).
The strongest political party held a greater percentage of seats than in 1997 (and 1993), 
but the two strongest parties combined had signiﬁcantly fewer seats than in 1997.
This could be explained by the fact that in 1997 two similarly strong political grou-
pings (one on the right and one on the left) competed in election, whereas in 2001 an 
asymmetric situation developed, with one strong left-wing party and greater number 
of distinctly weaker right-wing parties participating in election. Only in 1993 was the 
situation similar; the two strongest parties combined still had a greater percentage of 
seats than in 2001. Not only the process of realignment on the political scene but also 
the changed electoral system are responsible for this outcome. 
Table 5: Election results of the strongest party and the two strongest parties combi-
ned from 1993 to 2001
Election 1993 1997 2001
% of Seats% of seats 
of the strongest party




46.96 (Alliance of 
the Democratic Left 
– Labour Union)
% of Seats% of seats 
of the two strongest 
parties together
65.86 (Alliance of the 




+ Alliance of the 
Democratic Left)
61.09 (Alliance of 
the Democratic Left 
– Labour Union + Civic 
Platform)
Sources: Antoszewski (2002a: 145); Sokół (2005:267).
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Another important consequence of the 2001 reform was the bringing to an end of 
the declining trend in ﬁgures of the fragmentation index and the index of the effective
number of parties; both measure fragmentation of the party system (in our case at 
the parliamentary level). The values of these indexes rose after a drop in 1997. Rae’s 
fragmentation index climbed to 0.72 and the index of the effective number of parties to 
3.6 (Antoszewski, Herbut, Sroka, 2003: 143, Raciborski, 2003: 98). These values are, 
however, not outside the range of average values for European countries (Antoszewski 
2002a: 144). The new electoral system did not cause any dramatic changes in this 
respect; it only stopped existing tendencies. 
If we look at the trends in a longer term perspective, i.e. in comparison with the 
2005 election, we can observe the strengthening of proportional effects of the electoral 
system. All indicators show further deconcentration and fragmentation of the party 
system. The strongest party (Law and Justice) gained 26.99 per cent of seats, and the 
two strongest parties combined (Law and Justice + Civic Platform) 51.13 per cent 
of seats. The aggregation index fell to 3.37. Rae’s fragmentation index was 0.77 and 
the index of the effective number of parties 4.26. Rose’s proportionality index even 
surpassed the 1991 election by reaching 92 (all calculations made by the author). Of 
course, this was not caused solely by the electoral system, as changes took place in 
the political system before the 2005 election (disintegration of the heretofore united 
political left); as a result only small and medium-sized parties took part in the 2005 
election as opposed to the 2001 polls. The electoral system, however, did not in any 
way help to counterbalance these developments. 
Table 6: Party system after the election of 2005
Strongest party  
(% of seats)
Two strongest 












26.99 51.13 3.37 0.77 4.26 92
Source: author’s calculations .
The reasons for this, as well as the instant consequences of the 2001 electoral 
reform, are unmistakable and provide justiﬁcation for labelling this reform as “purpo-
seful” as opposed to “legitimate”. It brought to an end some positive tendencies within 
the parties and party systems, such as decreased fragmentation, over-representation of 
larger parties and under-representation of smaller ones, which had the related effect 
of making it easier to form a working majority in parliament. The objectives of this 
reform were planned beforehand and it indeed fulﬁlled the expectation of its architects,
namely to help smaller political groupings to enter Parliament at the expense of larger 
ones, albeit this assistance was understandably not particularly noticeable (Kubát, 
2005: 126).
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Important and speciﬁc factors of the electoral reforms in 1993 and 2001
An analysis of electoral engineering consists of examining the single components 
of an electoral system and determining their inﬂuence on electoral results. The modiﬁ-
cations to the proportional electoral systems are based precisely on the changes of these 
components. This was also the method undertaken by both Polish electoral reforms in 
1993 and in 2001, as the basic characteristics of the electoral system – proportional 
representation – remained unchanged. 
Generally speaking, as has already been mentioned above, political science em-
phasizes the importance of constituencies and mathematical methods of seat allocation 
as the most relevant components of proportional electoral systems in relation to their 
political consequences; less so is true for election thresholds and balancing distribution 
of seats. Polish researchers highlight three factors when analysing electoral reforms 
in Poland: constituencies, mathematical methods of seat allocation and electoral thre-
sholds. In general, this assessment is correct. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine 
which components had more and which had less overall impact, as both electoral 
reforms mentioned are very different in this respect. 
The 1993 electoral reform was more radical than the subsequent reform of 2001, 
and more factors inﬂuenced the outcomes at the same time. Whereas the reform of
2001 consisted mainly of the modiﬁcation of two factors, namely constituencies and
the mathematical methods of seat allocation, the electoral reform of 1993 brought 
about the introduction of electoral thresholds as well. Political science assigns lesser 
importance to electoral thresholds, as they indeed prevent very small parties (which 
are often transient) from entering Parliament and thus preclude its atomization, but 
this is their only effect; electoral thresholds do not help in the process of majority 
formation and do not strengthen the effectiveness of Parliament (Novák, 1996: 411). 
Furthermore, electoral thresholds have no effect on the proportionality of electoral 
systems of proportional representation (Antoszewski, 1997: 241). The claim that 
electoral thresholds are of limited importance is correct, but only in the long run. The 
effect of the electoral threshold is twofold: mechanical as well as psychological. The 
mechanical effect is instant: it simply prevents parties who do not reach the threshold 
from getting into Parliament. The psychological effect means that voters gradually 
realize that voting for ephemeral groupings does not make sense, as they do not have 
any chance of reaching the threshold anyway; such voters start casting their votes for 
the larger parties, where it is clear that they will not have problems with reaching the 
electoral threshold (for mechanical and psychological effects see Duverger, 1965: 224-
226). Voters realize this fact gradually, which means that time plays an important role. 
The introduction of an electoral threshold therefore has a devastating impact in the 
beginning, but its effects become weaker as time passes. This is exactly what happened 
in Poland. The introduction of electoral thresholds in 1993 led to 34.52 per cent of 
votes being discarded, i.e. 34.52 per cent of the votes cast did not lead to election of 
a single deputy! In the next election the number of discarded votes fell to 12.34 per 
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cent and in 2001 to 9.37 per cent of the votes (Cześnik, Markowski, 2004: 47; Kubát, 
2000: 109).31 This development is related to a dramatic ﬂuctuation of the extent of
proportionality of the electoral system in 1993. 
The effect of electoral thresholds was a highly speciﬁc component of the electoral
reform of 1993 and thus in a way overshadowed other factors. It is generally accepted 
that the size of constituencies was of major importance. I think this factor was indeed 
very important, but not the most important. The structure of constituencies in 1991 
shows that even though they were large, their size was not excessive.






of constituencies  
(percent)
 7  4 10.8
 8  5 13.5
 9  5 13.5
10  7 18.9
11  3  8.1
12  5 13.5
13  4 10.8
14  1  2.7
15  1  2.7
17  2  5.4
Total 37 100
Source: Alberski, Jednaka (1994: 73-74).
It is correct to argue that decreasing the size of constituencies was signiﬁcant, but
again, not radically so (the average size dropped from 10.6 to 7.5).32 More detailed 
studies of the structure of constituencies showed that they contributed more to the ma-
jority effect of the proportional electoral system than to its proportionality (Raciborski 
2003: 85). In 2001 the constituencies grew, even surpassing the 1991 sizes; again, this 
change was not dramatic and in international comparison these constituencies are not 
exceptionally large. The smallest constituency had 7 available seats, the largest one 
19 seats (average size of constituency was 10.6 in 1991 and 11.2 in 2001). 
31 In the election of 2005 it was 10.93 per cent, more than in 2001 (data from the Polish State Election 
Committee, see www.pkw.gov.pl). The reason is the ongoing disintegration of parties before election. 
32 The most signiﬁcant drop was in the size of the smallest constituencies, from 7 to 3.
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Table 8: Number and size of constituencies in 2001
Size of constituency Number of constituencies Number of constituencies (%)
 7  1  2.43
 8  3  7.29
 9 11 26.73
10  4  9.72
11  2  4.86
12  7 17.01
13  4  9.72
14  3  7.29
15  3  7.29
16  1  2.43
18  1  2.43
19  1  2.43
Total 41 100
Source: Jednaka (2002: 91).
This could lead us to the idea that mathematical methods of seat allocation had more 
impact than the size of constituencies (keeping in mind the interconnectedness of all fac-
tors). This claim can be veriﬁed by using evidence of the 2001 electoral reform, which
was not marked by the speciﬁc phenomenon of establishing new electoral thresholds.
The method of the largest remainder with Hare-Niemeyer quota was replaced in 
1993 by the d’Hondt method. In 2001 Poland returned to the Sainte-Laguë method, 
which was used in 1991 in a modiﬁed form for the selection of 15 per cent of the avai-
lable seats. What changes were brought by the change of the mathematical method, 
and what would have happened had the original method remained unchanged? 
Table 9: Simulation of electoral results for the 2001 Sejm election using different 
mathematical methods of seat allocation (number of seats; ﬁgures are rounded up)






























d’Hondt** 245 53.3 62 13.5 47 10.2 38 8.3 37 8.0 29 6.3 2 0.4
Sainte-Laguë*** 216 47 65 14.1 53 11.5 44 9.6 42 9.1 38 8.3 2 0.4
*  The electoral threshold does not apply to the German Minority  party.
** Simulation of election results.
*** Modiﬁed version. Actual election results.
Sources: Raciborski (2003: 90), author’s calculations.
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If we compare the effects of both methods, the modiﬁed Sainte-Laguë  method
used in 2001 and the d’Hondt method used in 1993 and 1997, with respect to the 2001 
election, we come to the unequivocal conclusion that both methods deﬁnitely inﬂuence
election results, each in a different way. The Sainte-Laguë method caused a slight 
over-representation of all political parties in Parliament, including smaller and medi-
um-sized parties. The d’Hondt method would have had the effect of signiﬁcantly over-
-representing larger parties (in this case only one party: the Alliance of the Democratic 
Left, which received over 40 per cent of the votes), slightly over-representing the one 
medium sized party (Civic Platform; 12.68 per cent of the votes) and considerably 
under-representing smaller parties (with less than 10 per cent of the votes). (By the 
way, we emphasize again that these ﬁgures are not relevant for the speciﬁc German
Minority.)
Table 10: Deformation index in 2001 using different mathematical methods  
of seat allocation 
Political party % of votes Deformation index (Sainte-Laguë*)
Deformation index 
(d’Hondt**)
Alliance of the Democratic 
Left – Labour Union 41.04 1.144 1.299
Civic Platform 12.68 1.114 1.065
Self-Defence 10.20 1.129 1.000
Law and Justice  9.50 1.007 0.874
Polish Peasant’s Party  8.98 1.028 0.900
League of Polish Families  7.87 1.050 0.810
German Minority*** 0.36 1.104 1.111
*  Modiﬁed version. Actual election results
** Simulation of election results.
*** The electoral threshold does not apply to the German Minority .
Source: author’s calculations.
The different effects of both mathematical models of seat allocation can be demon-
strated well by the values of indexes measuring the fragmentation of the party system, 
i.e. the Rae’s fragmentation index and the index of the effective number of parties. 
In the case of the modiﬁed Sainte-Laguë method the fragmentation index is 0.72 and 
the index of the effective number of parties 3.6. Using the d’Hondt method instead, 
the values would decrease to 0.67 (Rae’s fragmentation index) and 3.04 (index of 
the effective number of parties) (author’s calculations). The values of the aggregation 
index also show signiﬁcant impact of the d’Hondt method, favouring concentration of
the party system and impairing its fragmentation. The modiﬁed Sainte-Laguë method 
led to an aggregation index of 6.71. Electoral simulation using the d’Hondt method 
raises the value of this index to 7.61 (author’s calculations ). 
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The aforementioned facts demonstrate some speciﬁc features of both Polish elec-
toral reforms, which however do contradict the theories of electoral systems and their 
political consequences. The importance of electoral thresholds has been conﬁrmed,
albeit only in the initial period, i.e. at the time of their implementation (in 1993). The 
psychological effect later caused their inﬂuence to fade, as time passes (the threshold
ceases to have signiﬁcant impact on level of proportionality of the given electoral
system).33 The Polish electoral reforms showed the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of mathema-
tical methods of seat allocation and redistribution on the overall effect of an electoral 
system. In the case of Poland, the inﬂuence of mathematical methods was even greater,
as changes in size of constituencies (another key factor) were de facto small. The 
size of constituency could not alone have had a sufﬁciently strong effect and all the
“burden of responsibility” fell on mathematical methods (this is best demonstrated by 
the electoral reform of 2001). 
Conclusion
Some Polish authors express doubts about electoral system being the key variable 
for the formation of party system and subsequently having an inﬂuence on politics.
Stanisław Gebethner (1995: 31) or Zbigniew Szeliga (1997: 13) ﬁrmly insist that the
electoral system of 1991 did not cause extreme fragmentation of the Sejm from1991 to 
1993. They argue that this fragmentation originated from polarization in society (vo-
ters) and the political scene, and that the electoral system merely enabled this to be truly 
reﬂected in parliament. This line of reasoning leads to the argument that the electoral
reform of 1993 was in fact unnecessary, as consolidation in the political arena as well as 
in society in general – which was a part of the democratic consolidation of the overall 
political system – would have modiﬁed the party system at the parliamentary level and
in the realm of politics in general, without the “intervention” of the electoral system.
Such reasoning does not seem to be correct. The electoral system of 1991 was 
indeed not the primary cause of the bad condition of politics in Poland at the beginning 
of the 1990s. However, by having such parameters which allowed even the smallest 
political factions represented by often ephemeral political groupings access to the Sejm, 
it directly transferred the social polarization and fragmentation to Parliament, thus 
paralyzing its efﬁciency from the start. S. Gebethner (1993: 173) argues that even if the
5 per cent electoral threshold had been used in the 1991 election, nine groupings would 
have entered Parliament, which would result in its fragmentation anyway. This claim 
deserves our critical attention. First of all, it makes a large difference for the efﬁciency
of Parliament if there are 9 or 29 parties (in the 1991 election 24 electoral committees 
acquired seats, representing 29 parties)34; secondly, the claim does not stand the test of 
the 1993 election. They took place under politically similar (albeit not identical) con-
ditions as in 1991. The party arena continued to be heavily fragmented, especially on 
33 This does not concern the mechanical effect, which remains constant.
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the political right. The new electoral system had the effect of preventing transfer of this 
fragmentation to parliament, which subsequently looked very different. As correctly 
noted by A. Antoszewski (2002c: 45), an analysis of the development of the party 
system in Poland shows that its institutionalization and stabilization occurred thanks 
to the overcoming of the extreme fragmentation and due to increased concentration. 
“It follows mainly  – albeit not completely – from the change of the electoral system in 
1993, which made access to Parliament much more difﬁcult for small parties and made
it clear to the voters that they needed to start voting strategically, i.e. casting votes for 
parties, which have realistic chances of getting into the Sejm (ibid).” All indicators 
analysed in this text support such a conclusion. Similarly, the electoral reform of 2001 
had a visible inﬂuence on evolution of the party system, in this case in the opposite
direction. This can be demonstrated not only by the 2001 election, but also by the 2005 
election, as the process of deconcentration of the party system started by the electoral 
reform of 2001 continued. 
To be sure, the electoral system is not omnipotent. For example it cannot prevent 
changes in the party system throughout the electoral term (movement of deputies 
between parliamentary clubs, fragmentation or consolidation of existing parties), which 
are so typical for politics in Poland. The electoral system nonetheless unequivocally 
and unambiguously shapes the deﬁning impulse for formation of the party system, both
in the short and long-term perspective. Poland is an excellent example in this respect. 
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